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I

n the armed conflict with AI Qaeda inside and outside Afghanistan, I the US
government has had to grapple with difficult legal issues concerning who can
be detained. In this brief essay, I discuss whether US practices have been consistent
with the law of ar med conflict (LOAC). Three specific issues are considered. The
first is a th reshold question: Does LOAC regulate who can be detained in a noninternational armed conflict? After cond uding that it does, I address two questions
that implicate the substantive criteria for detention. First, is it lawful to detain civilians who have not directly participated in hostilities? Second, is it lawfu1 to detain
individuals for a lo ng or indefinite period for the purpose of gathering intelligence?
Since September 11, the US government has adjusted its detention practices to
overcome various legal defects. These three issues remain among the fundamental
challenges to the detention regime.
It is not obvious that LOAC regulates the substantive grounds for detention in
non -international arm ed confli ct. Neither Com m on Article 3 nor Additional Protocol II explicitly addresses the subject. They contain no language expressly prohibiting arbitrary detention or unlawful confinement. Sim ilarly, the Rome Statute
for the Internatio nal Criminal Court includes "unlawful confinement" in a list of
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war crimes in international armed conilict.2 Unlawful confinement, however, is
conspicuously absent from the Statute's list of war crimes in non-international
armed conflict. Additionally, a 2004 expert meeting-which included Louise
Doswald-Beck, Knut Dormann, Robert Goldman, Walter Kalin, Judge Theodore
Meron, Sir Nigel Rodleyand Jelen a PejiC---concludes that LOAC does not contain
rules precluding unlawful confinement in non-international armed conflicts:
Non -International Armed ConJ1ids

The experts noted that there are no provisions requiring certain reasons for detention,
nor any procedures to prevent unnecessary detention. It was further observed that
there are no specific supervisory mechanisms other than the minimal requirement that
the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Crossl be allowed to offer its services. It
was stated, therefore, that only national law is relevant, as well as international human
rights law.)
Some legal advisers at the International Committee of the Red Cross (JC Re)
have helped support this view. A presentation at the 2004 meeting by Donnann,
Deputy Head of the Legal Division of the JCRC, states: " International hwnanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflicts contains no provisions requiring certain grounds for detentionlinternment nor are there any procedures
defined to ch eck the need for such detention."4 An important article in the Intemational Review ofthe Red Cross b y Je1ena Pej ic, Legal Adviser in the JCRC Legal Division, is more equivocal. She states:
In non-international armed conflicts there is even less clarity as to how administrative
detention is to be organized. Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, which is
applicable as a minimum standard to all non-international armed conflicts, contains
no provisions regulating internment, i.e. administrative detention for security reasons,
apart from the requirement of humane treatment. 5
Pejic does not elaborate whether or to what extent the requirement of humane
treatment might directly regulate the use of security rationales or other grounds for
confinement.
Many of these experts find some solace in the notion that gaps in LOAC are intolerable (else a legal black hole) and that those gaps would be filled by international human rights law. The 2004 expert meeting. in which Pejic, Dormann and
others participated, concludes:
The experts stated that as IHL does not provide procedural guarantees to persons
detained during non-international armed conflict, human rights standards must
always apply . .. . The general view was that instead of trying to amend humanitarian
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law to remedy its failings, the standards applicable to non-international armed conflict
should be those of hwnan rights law and subject to human rights remedies.6
International human rights law, however, is not accorded the same legal (or symbolic) weight in US law and practice as the Geneva Conventions or customary international humanitarian law. Hence, the exclusion of LOAC from this domain
would leave a substantial void in the definition and regulation of impermissible
behavior.
According to the weight oflegal authority, however, no such gap exists. Unlawful confmement is prohibited by Common Article 3 (e.g., as a form of inhumane
treatment ) and by customary international humanitarian law. Under the framework set forth in Common Article 3, the power to detain is subject to a nwnber of
substantive constraints. First, individuals cannot be detained on discriminatory
grounds such as "race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other
similar criteria."7Second, parties to a conflict are prohibited from taking hostages.
According to the ICRC Commentary, that prohibition is based on a fundamental
principle of justice:
The taking of hostages, like reprisals, to which it is often the prelude, is contrary to the
modern idea of justice in that it is based on the principle of collective responsibility fo r
crime. Both strike at persons who are innocent of the crime which it is intended to
prevent or punish.8
In other words, if a person does not bear individual responsibility for a security
threat to the State, he should not be deprived of his liberty, even if confining him
could prevent the threat from materializing. Third, Common Article 3 prohibits
the passing of a sentence without affording fundamental judicial guarantees, and
that provision implicitly restricts the use of administrative detention for punitive
purposes.
More generally, unlawful confmement is prohibited by a broad-based obligation under Common Article 3: hors de combat "shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely."9 Indeed, the recent 2005 JCRC study on customary international humanitarian law states that, asa matter of treaty law, "arbitrary deprivation ofliberty
is not compatible" with humane treatment under Common Article 3.10 Joanna
Dingwall argues persuasively that Common Article 3 prohibits unlawful confinement as a form of "cruel treatment. "II And, the overriding obligation of h umane
treatment is even more clearly and directly connected to the sources that Dingwall
invokes. 12 As an analytic matter, these interpretations of humane treatment are not
precluded by the existence of text explicitly prohibiting unlawful confinement in international conflicts, but the absence of text referring to unlawful
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confinement in Common Article 3. Rape is not explicitly prohibited by Common
Article 3 either; yet it is well understood that rape is covered by the article. n The
protections codified in Common Article 3 are simply written in broader terms.
International authorities also suggest that unlawful confinement is prohibited
in non-international armed conflict as a matter of customary international law. In
considering the practices of armed opposition groups in Colombia's civil war, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights stated: "International humanitarian law also prohibits the detention or internment of civilians except where necessary for imperative reasons of security."14 Liesbeth Zegveld also reports that the
UN Commission on Human Rights drew from international humanitarian law applicable to international armed conflicts in demanding armed opposition groups
refrain from arbitrary detention in Afghanistan ( 1993) and in the Sudan ( 1995).15
In addition, Article 3 of the Turku Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards proscribes the disappearance of individuals, "including their abduction or
unacknowledged detention. "16 And Article 11 of the Turku Declaration includes
an implicit restriction on substantive grounds for detention: "If it is considered
necessary for imperative reasons of security to subject any person to assigned residence, internment or administrative detention, such decisions shall be subject to a
regular procedure prescribed by law .. . ."17
Once the question whether LOAC prohibits arbitrary detention is resolved in
the affirmative, a second-order question is whether LOAC permits the administrative detention of civilians, including civilians who do not directly participate in
hostilities. 18 That question has arisen in recent litigation, and federal judges have
been divided on the issue. 19 The Fourth Geneva Convention rules on internment
are the most directly relevant in this regard. 2o And, in accordance with Articles 5,
27, 4 1-43 and 78 of the Civilians Convention, States are permitted to detain not
only civilians who directly participate in hostilities (e.g., unlawful combatants) but
also civilians whose indired participation in hostilities poses a security threat. At
first blush, US practices in the conflict with AI Qaeda do not necessitate making
such distinctions. The US government has formally claimed the authority, in
legislation 21 and in executive action,22 to detain only "unlawful combatants." However, the government's peculiar definition of "combatants" and its actual detention decisions betray a contrary policy of detaining civilians who have, at most,
indirectly participated in hostilities.23
Although LOAC does not forbid the detention of this broader class of civilians,
domestic law might. For example. an important constitutional distinction may exist with respect to classes of individuals who can be subject to military jurisdiction.
The constitutional line may be drawn between "combatants" (including direct
participants in hostilities) and civilians, and LOAC should help define the
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boundaries of those groups for constitutional purposes. Indeed, if the government
wishes to detain individuals in the latter group, it may be required to adopt laws explicitly subjecting "civilians" to detention. The basis for that dear statement rule
would derive from domestic law, however, and not LOAC itself.
A remaining question is whether the United States can detain individuals, on a
long-term or indefinite basis, for the purpose of gathering intelligence. Before analyzing that question oflaw, first consider the record of US detention practices following September 11. The government has used intelligence value as a ground for
initial internment decisions, as well as for denying release. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs Professor Matthew Waxman recently
wrote: " Intelligence gathering through questioning of those in custody constitutes
another important reason for detention in warfare, and especially in fighting terrorist networks. "24 With respect to the global sphere of operations, the 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual states that information gathering provides a reason for
detaining two classes of individuals: (1) "persons who have engaged in, or assisted
those who engage in, terrorist or insurgent activities" and (2) " persons who have
incidentally obtained knowledge regarding insurgent and terrorist activity, but
who are not guilty of associating with such groups. "25 Notably, information gathering appears to be an independent basis for detaining the first category of individuals even if they no longer pose a security threat.26 However, for the second
category, the Counterinsurgency m anual states: "Since persons in the second category have not engaged in criminal or insurgent activities, they must be released,
even if they refuse to provide information. "21 It stands to reason that individuals in
the first category could be denied release if they refuse to provide information. As
another component of global operations, President George Bush announced that
under the CIA's secret detention program "[m]an y are released after questioning,
or turned over to local authorities-if we determine that they do not pose a continuing threat and no longer have significant intelligence value."28
With respect to detention in Guantanamo specifically, in determining whether
a detainee should be transferred to the base, US military screening teams and the
combatant commander must consider " the possible intelligence that may be
gained from the detainee."29 And administrative review boards (ARB) may consider whether a detainee "is of continuing intelligence value" in deciding whether
to recommend release. 30 That standard appears to regularize practices that predated the ARB process. 31 Although stated in a summary fashion, a joint report by
UN human rights officials concerning Guantanamo concludes "that the objective
of the ongoing detention is not primarily to prevent combatants from taking up
arms against the United States again, but to obtain infonnation and gather intelligence on the Al-Qaeda network. "32
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Within the United States, the cases of individuals such as Jose Padilla and Ali
Saleh Kahlah al-Marri suggest that intelligence value may constitute a dominant
rationale for detention. In Padilla's case, the Solicitor General argued before the
Supreme Court that "It lhe detention of enemy combatants serves two vital purposes directly connected to prosecuting the war. First, detention prevents captured
combatants from rejoining the enemy and continuing the fight. Second, detention
enables the military to gather critical intelligence from captured combatants concerning the capabilities and intentions of the enemy."}} For the latter proposition,
the Solicitor General cited and included, as an appendix to his brief, a declaration
by Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.34 The
Jacoby Declaration focuses on the need to obtain information from the detainee as
the basis for military confinement outside of the criminal justice system. 3S In alMarri's case, federal judges expressed concern over the apparent interrogationbased reasons for transferring the petitioner from criminal jurisdiction to military
administrative detention:
[N]ot only has the Government offered no other explanation [than interrogation
purposes] for abandoning al-Marri's prosecution, it has even propounded an affidavit
in support of aI-Marri's continued military detention, stating that he "possesses
information of high intelligence value." See Rapp. Declaration. Moreover, former
AttorneyGenerai John Ashcroft has explained that the Government decided to decla re
al-Marri an enemy combatant only after he became a "hard case" by "reject[ing]
numerous offers to improve his lot by ... providing information." John Ashcroft,
Never Again: Securing America and Restoring Justice 168-69 (2006).36

Professor Marty Lederman, a leading expert on US detention policy since September
II , summarizes his view of the overall scheme: "Unlike in past conflicts, when the
purpose of detention was incapacitation of actual combatants so that they could not
fight against us, the dominant purpose of this detention regime is intelligencegathering. "37
It is important to recognize that intelligence value has also constituted an independent basis for administrative detention in Iraq.}8 Consider Lieutenant Andru
Wall's account of detainee operations:
Officially, individuals could be detained fo r their intelligence value for no more than 72
hours; however, anecdotal evidence suggested that longer intelligence detentions were
common. The argwnent in favor of intelligence detentions was that, for example, if an
individual knew who was responsible for carrying out attacks on Coalition Forces ...
then withholding [this information] constituted an imperative threat to the security of
Coalition Forces .. . . The argument against such detentions was that the individual
himself did not pose an imperative security threat.
39
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Other reports also find that intelligence value constituted a-formal and informal-ground fo r detention in Iraq.40
Three arguments might be raised to support the legality of US practice. First, the
Geneva Conventions contain no express prohibition on the use of detention for
intelligence-gathering purposes. Second, detention is permitted if obtaining the
relevant information serves an imperative security interest. Third, if a State has the
authority to detain an individual until the cessation of hostilities, the State has the
prerogative to release her earlier if she provides valuable intelligence information.
At the outset in addressing these arguments we should note that an express provision of the Geneva Conventions may not be necessary if the regime implicitly
contemplates that the only basis for detention is to prevent individuals returning to
the fight. A customary norm may also suffice if treaties do not. And, even ifLOAC
permits interrogation incidental to detention, it does not necessarily permit detention for the purpose of interrogation. Nor does it permit coercive interrogation.
Let's turn to an elaboration of some of these points and other points as well.
First, all three arguments are contradicted by legal authorities that have addressed the subject with respect to the general LOAC regime. The ICRC publicly
criticized the use ofGuantanamo for interrogation purposes. 4 ! The joint report of
UN officials declared: "The indefinite detention of prisoners of war and civilian internees for purposes of continued interrogation is inconsistent with the provisions
of the Geneva Conventions."42 And a plurality of the US Supreme Court stated in
dicta: "Certainly, we agree that indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized."43 Some commentators have suggested that the plurality's
statement isconclusory and without citation to legal authority. However, in earlier
passages, the opinion references authorities suggesting that detention is permitted
exclusively to prevent individuals returning to the battlefield.44 US policy, accordingly, contradicts the collective judgment of the US Supreme Court (in a plurality
opinion), the ICRC and UN human rights officials.
Second, other provisions of the Geneva Conventions indirectly support the
conclusion that indefinite or long-term detention is permitted only to prevent individuals returning to the battlefield. In general, detaining powers argue against
early release of prisoners of war on the ground that the individuals might return to
the fight. However, some detainees are too sick or wounded to return to the battlefield. 4s A valuable question for our purposes is whether the detaining power could
nevertheless hold the individual to gather intelligence. The Prisoner of War
(POW) Convention is clear; it places a categorical obligation to repatriate such individuals to their home countries. 46 There is no exception for detaining or precluding release of individuals on any other grounds such as intelligence value.
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Third, the most relevant rules may not be found directly in provisions regulating detention. The most relevant source may be found in rules governing interrogation. And those interrogation rules preclude the initial decision to detain an
individual, as well as the purported prerogative to order release of a detainee who
provides information. More specifically, the use of intelligence value violates Article 17 of the POW Convention and Article3 1 of the Civilians Convention. Both articles strictly prohibit physical and moral coercion to obtain information from
detainees.47 Accordingly, individuals who are interrogated should not receive
better treatment (release from detention) or worse treatment (continued confinement ) on the basis of whether they provide or withhold information. In short, the
relevant LOAC rules are found more directly in provisions regulating methods of
interrogations, rather than provisions regulating grounds for detention. Notably,
the former constitutes an independent basis for the application of LOAC in noninternational armed conflicts. That is, even if LOAC does not regulate unlawful
confinement in non -international armed conflict, it undoubtedly regulates coercive interrogations.
Fourth, an individual's possession of infonnation does not constitute a valid security rationale for internment under the Civilians Convention. According to the
ICRC Commentary, States have significant discretion to define activities that
threaten their security.-48 The Commentary, however, also suggests that the individuals must themselves directly pose the threat. The paradigmatic examples provided
by the Commentary include" [s Jubversive activity carried on inside the territory of
a Party to the conflict or actions which are of direct assistance to an enem y
Power."49 More specific examples include "members of organizations whose object is to cause disturbances, or .. . [individuals who] may seriously prejudice itssecurity by other means, such as sabotage or espionage."so Moreover, as described
above, various authorities, including the ICRC, UN human rights officials and the
Supreme Court, have repudiated intelligence-based grounds for detention . Those
rejections were absolute and were issued in the context of security-based reasons
for gathering intelligence.
Finally, the im plications of allowing intelligence value as an independent
ground for long-tenn or indefinite detention are intolerable. Doing so might permit the confinement of individuals, such as the children or other family members
of combatants, who have no engagement in hostilities b ut have personal knowledge about the combatants. It might also permit the confinement of innocent detainees who do not have information themselves but are held as bargaining chips to
coerce other individuals to provide information. And, a further implication is suggested by the declaration of Admiral Jacoby. He contends that "the intelligence cycle is contin uous. This dynamic is especially important in the War on Terrorism.
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There is a constant need to ask detainees new lines of questions as additional detainees are taken into custody and new information is obtained from them and
from other intelligence-gathering methods."S\ That justification essentially provides for continuing to hold individuals even if they have exhausted their current
intelligence value. In sum, it is not too much of a stretch to suggest that "detaining
individuals on the basis of what they were believed to know could be a slippery
slope lead ing to mass, unwarranted detentions."s2
Since September 11, the United States has adjusted its detention practices in response to powerful objections. Some of the remaining objections are valid and others not. As a threshold matter, an important point is that the laws of war prohibit
unlawful confmement in non-international armed conflict. The Obama administration provides a new opportunity to reassess detention policy through that legal
framework.
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